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Expectation Damages and the
Theory of Overreliance
by
MELVIN A. EISENBERG & BRETT H. MCDONNELL*
Introduction
The basic remedy for breach of a bargain contract is the
expectation measure of damages, which puts the injured party where
she would have been if the contract had been performed. It is
generally accepted that the expectation measure provides efficient
incentives to a promisor. Beginning about twenty years ago,
however, law-and-economics scholars developed a model of damages
which showed that the expectation measure can provide inefficient
incentives to a promisee. The theory is that the expectation measure
insures the promisee's reliance, and therefore may cause the promisee
to overrely-that is, to invest more heavily in reliance than efficiency
requires. The theory of overreliance is not limited in its application
to the expectation measure, but it is most salient to that measure, just
because the expectation measure is the gold standard in a bargain
context.
The model upon which the theory of overreliance is based
provides an important insight into the theory of contract damages.
As time went on, however, law-and-economics scholars lost sight of
the fact that the model only showed that under certain conditions the
expectation measure can provide inefficient incentives to promisees.
Instead, they widely began to assume, explicitly or implicitly, that the
expectation measure normally does provide inefficient incentives to
promisees. The objective of this Article is to rehabilitate the
expectation measure by showing that when institutional
considerations are taken into account, expectation damages normally
do not provide inefficient incentives to promisees. In particular, we
* We thank Adam Badawi, Brian Bix, Bob Cooter, Aaron Edlin, Dan Farber, Avery
Katz, Howard Tony Loo, David McGowan, Omri Ben-Shahar, Ariel Porat, Paul Rubin,
and participants at the University of Michigan Law and Economics Seminar for their
extremely valuable comments.
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show that as a result of institutional considerations: (1) In most cases,
overreliance normally cannot or is highly unlikely to occur. (2) Even
in cases in which overreliance can occur, the expectation measure
does not fully insure a promisee's reliance. (3) Although the
expectation measure could be modified to address the few residual
problems that might remain, the costs of such a modification would
almost certainly exceed the benefits.
I. The Justifications of the Expectation Measure of
Damages, and the Overreliance Critique
The basic remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages,
that is, damages measured by the amount required to put the injured
party into the position she would have been in if the contract had
been performed. There are a number of justifications for using this
measure. We focus for the moment on the incentive effects of
damage measures on (1) the amount of precaution that a promisor
takes to ensure that he will be able to perform, and (2) a promisor's
decision whether to perform or breach when performance has
become unprofitable or an alternative performance has become more
profitable.' The expectation measure places on the promisor the
promisee's loss of her share of the contract's value in the event of
breach, and thereby efficiently sweeps that value into the promisor's
calculus of self-interest in making decisions on both precaution and
breach.
The effect of expectation damages on the promisor's calculations
can also be stated in terms of externalities. A negative externality
exists when one person is not required to pay for imposing a cost
upon another. Incentives for precaution and performance are
efficient if they compel a promisor to balance the gains to him of not
performing against the losses to the promisee. If the promisor does
not perform, the promisee loses her share of the value of the contract.
If the promisor is liable for that loss, he internalizes the full value of
performance to the promisee. Accordingly, expectation damages
create efficient incentives for the promisor's precaution and
performance.
By directly affecting the probability that the promisor will
perform, the expectation measure has an indirect effect upon the
promisee's behavior, which can be stated in terms of planning. Under
a regime of expectation damages, the promisee can plan more
reliably, because once a contract is made she can engage in private
1. Damage measures will affect other decisions as well, such as whether to enter into
a contract, what information to reveal to other contracting parties, and how much the
promisee should rely upon a contract. We consider the reliance incentive in depth, but
touch only briefly on the other issues.
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ordering with some confidence that she will realize the expected value
of that ordering, whether by performance or damages. Furthermore,
it is in the promisor's interest that the promisee be able to plan
reliably, because the ability to do so will make the promisee willing to
pay a higher price for the promise. The promisee will be willing to
pay more because she is more certain about the expected return
under the expectation measure, and is willing to pay more for a more
certain return. This reduction in uncertainty is a social gain.
Despite these and other justifications, the expectation measure
has come under various kinds of scholarly criticism. One of these
criticisms is the theory of overreliance, first developed by Steven
Shavell2 and later elaborated by others, including Lewis Kornhauser,
Robert Cooter, William Rogerson, Aaron Edlin, and Stefan
Reichelstein' In brief, the theory is that the expectation measure
provides an incentive to a promisee to rely on a contract to a greater
extent than is efficient by selecting a level of reliance as if
performance of the contract is certain-is, in effect, insured-when in
fact there is always a chance that the promisor will breach.
Here is the theory in more detail:
In a bargain context, a promisee can often increase the value of a
contract by relying upon it. For example, take the followinf
hypothetical, developed by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen:
Yvonne owns a restaurant for economists called the Waffle Shop.
Business is going well, and Yvonne contracts with Xavier to build a
new facility to be ready for occupancy by September 1. Many things
could prevent Xavier from completing on time-bad weather, a
plumbers' strike, overscrupulous or unscrupulous city inspectors, and
so on. To serve the new customers who will patronize the new
facility, Yvonne must order more food, and she must order it before
September 1. Greater expenditures on food will increase her profits
from the restaurant, since she will then be able to serve more
customers in the period following September 1.
2. See Steven Shavell, Damage Remedies for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON.
466, 472 (1980); Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J.
ECON. 121,124 (1984).
3. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of
Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-19 (1985); Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-
Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J. ECON. & ORG.
98, 98-101 (1996); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach
Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478, 487-91 (1998); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract. 26 J.L. & ECON. 691, 693
(1983); William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON.
39, 47-48 (1984).
4. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 248-57 (3d ed.
2000).
Under the standard calculation of expectation damages, a
promisee will increase expenditures in reliance on a contract up to the
point where the expected gain from an incremental increase in such
expenditures equals the cost of the incremental increase. Now, even
if the promisor fully internalizes all the costs of breach that are borne
by the promisee, there is some chance that the promisor (Xavier, in
the hypothetical) will breach-for example, if the costs of performing
unexpectedly turn out to be prohibitive. In choosing the socially
optimal amount of reliance on the contract, the promisee (Yvonne, in
the hypothetical) should take this chance of non-performance into
account. However, the standard expectation measure does not give
the promisee an incentive to choose the socially optimal level of
reliance. In particular, when calculating the expected gain from an
increase in reliance expenditures, the promisee will not discount that
expected gain by the probability that the promisor will breach. From
the promisee's point of view, it is as if the promisor had insured the
promisee that the contract would be performed. The promisee thus
acts as if performance is certain, and chooses a level of reliance on the
promise consistent with that assumption. The level of reliance so
chosen will be higher than the level that would be chosen if the
promisee assumed that the promisor had a positive probability of
breach. Choosing the higher level is inefficient. Accordingly, the
expectation measure is flawed.5
5. We present here the algebraic formulation of the Cooter and Ulen hypothetical
because we will be drawing on the formulation at several points below to help illustrate
and deepen our logic. See infra notes 9, 17, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 40. Let x be Xavier's
expenditures on measures to assure that construction is not delayed, and p be the
probability that construction is completed on time. Then p is a function of x, p(x), with
dp/dx > 0. Let y be Yvonne's expenditures on food orders. Her revenues are Rp(y) if
Xavier performs on time, and Rnp(y) if Xavier breaches, with Rp(y) > Rnp(y) and dR/dy >
0. The expected social gain is p(x)Rp(y) + (I - p(x))Rnp(y) - x - y. The optimal choice of
precaution x is given by this expected first order condition with respect to x: p'(x)(Rp(y) -
Rnp(y)) = 1. The optimal choice for reliance y is given by this first order condition with
respect to y: p(x)Rp'(y) + (1 - p(x))Rnp'(y) = 1. Suppose that damages, which may vary
with reliance, are set at D(y), and that the contract price is K. Then Xavier's net income is
K - x - (I - p(x))D. The first order condition for this function is p'(x)D = 1. If we set D =
Rp(y) - Rnp(y), the expectation measure, then this condition becomes p'(x)(Rp(y) -
Rnp(y)) = 1, which is the efficient first order condition-expectation damages internalize
the cost of breach borne by Yvonne, and thus cause Xavier to set the optimal level of
precaution. (Actually, there is a subtle difference from the optimum. Xavier's choice of x
depends on Yvonne's choice of y, which we shall see in a moment is too big. This makes
Xavier's choice of x higher than at the social optimum. But, Xavier's choice of x is at a
socially optimal level given Yvonne's choice of y.) Yvonne's net income is p(x)Rp(y) + (I
- p(x))Rnp(y) + (1 - p(x))D - K - y. The first order condition for choosing y is p(x)R'p(y)
+ (1 -p(x))(R'np(y) + D'(y)) = 1. Comparing this to the condition for the optimal choice
of y above, Yvonne has the proper incentive only if D'(y) = 0, that is, only if the damages
she will receive remain unchanged by her choice of y. However, if D = Rp(y) - Rnp(y),
then D'(y) = R'(y) - R'np(y). Plugging this expression into Yvonne's first order condition
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To facilitate the analysis, we will employ several defined terms.
By a promisor, we mean a contracting party who is or may be in
breach. By a promisee, we mean a contracting party who is aggrieved
by a promisor's breach. By overreliance, we mean reliance by a
promisee that inefficiently disregards the promisor's rate of breach or,
to put it differently, that inefficiently treats the promisor's
performance as insured. By the standard expectation measure, we
mean expectation damages as presently conceived. By the theory of
overreliance, we mean the concept that the standard expectation
measure gives a promisee an incentive to rely on a contract to an
inefficiently great extent. By an overreliance rule, we mean a legal
rule under which the standard expectation measure would be
modified so as not to provide such an incentive.
In this Article, we accept the validity of the theory of efficient
breach. However, we show that the applicability of the theory to
actual contracting activity is exceptionally narrow, partly as a result of
institutional considerations (including the way in which expectation
damages are actually calculated in various contexts) and partly
because expectation damages provide much less than full insurance of
a promisee's reliance. More specifically, in Part II we show that as a
result of institutional considerations, in most cases overreliance
normally either cannot occur or is highly unlikely to occur. In Part
III, we show that even in cases in which overreliance can occur, the
promisee's reliance is not fully insured by the expectation measure.
In Part IV, we show that in the residual cases in which overreliance
may be a problem, the costs of modifying the standard expectation
measure to eliminate overreliance would probably far exceed the
benefits.
II. In Most Cases, Overreliance Normally Cannot Occur
In this Part, we show that as a result of institutional
considerations, the likely incidence of overreliance is so low that the
theory of overreliance fails to provide a significant reason to abandon
or even modify the standard expectation measure. We begin this Part
by showing that only one of the many categories of contractual
reliance-beneficial reliance-could normally give rise to
overreliance (Section A). Next, we show that even in the case of
yields R'p(y) = 1, which is the first order condition that would result from the social choice
if performance were certain. In general, this will lead to a different choice of y than the
socially optimal level, given a chance of breach. The non-optimal level of y which Yvonne
chooses will be greater than the efficient level. Notice that Yvonne's first order condition
for choosing y reduces to the socially optimal condition when D'(y) = 0, which is where the
damages received do not vary with Yvonne's choice of reliance expenditure, y. This fact
becomes important later in discussing reforms that economists have suggested.
beneficial reliance, the great majority of contractual transactions
either cannot or are highly unlikely to give rise to overreliance
(Section B).
A. Disaggregating Reliance
To understand the problem of overreliance properly, it is
necessary to disaggregate the concept of reliance itself. In this Part,
we consider four types of reliance: beneficial reliance, profit-
diminishing reliance, necessary reliance, and timing costs.
(1) Beneficial Reliance
Beneficial reliance is reliance on a contract that increases the
value of the contract to the promisee.' Xavier-Yvonne is one
example: If Yvonne orders the food before Xavier completes
construction, the contract with Xavier is worth more to her. Here is
another: Suppose Boatmaker agrees to build a commercial yacht-to
be named Seafarer-for Charterer, who plans to charter out the yacht
for luxury cruises. The parties agree that Boatmaker is not
responsible for providing or installing furnishings, navigational
equipment, safety equipment (such as lifeboats), or other ancillary
items. Boatmaker has a backlog of orders, and promises delivery in
six months. The navigational equipment that Charterer wants for
Seafarer must be ordered sixty days in advance. Charterer might
choose to wait to order this equipment until Seafarer is delivered.
However, Charterer will probably prefer to order the equipment sixty
days before delivery of Seafarer, so that he can charter out Seafarer
for a cruise as soon as it is delivered, thereby increasing the value of
the contract to him. The advance purchase of navigational equipment
constitutes beneficial reliance.
Or suppose that the Blue Angels, a rock group, contracts with
Promoter to give a concert in three months for a fixed fee of $100,000.
Promoter can greatly increase the value of the Blue Angels' contract
by advertising the concert in advance. The advance advertising
constitutes beneficial reliance.
Under the theory of overreliance, beneficial reliance can lead to
overreliance: A promisee who seeks to make a contract more
valuable to herself, by increasing the profits that the contract will
generate, may invest in beneficial reliance as if the promisor's
performance is insured-that is, without taking into account the
probability of breach.'
6. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1267 (1980).
7. Typically, an increase in beneficial reliance increases the promisee's damages by
increasing her expected profits. An increase in beneficial reliance may also increase the
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
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(2) Profit-Maximizing and Profit-Diminishing Reliance
Even if the expectation measure were not utilized in contract
law, a promisee might spend an inefficient amount on beneficial
reliance simply because she is imprudent. Suppose, for example, that
a promisee's beneficial reliance was fully and perfectly insured-by
which we mean that if the promisor breaches, the promisee will
costlessly get expectation damages without any discount for
overreliance. Even in such a case, a prudent promisee will not invest
in unlimited beneficial reliance. Instead, she will invest in beneficial
reliance only to the point where the last dollar spent on such reliance
just equals the marginal revenue that the additional expense will
generate. In the Xavier-Yvonne hypothetical, for example, even if
the standard expectation measure fully insures Yvonne against
breach, Yvonne will, if rational, make food expenditures only up to
that point where the cost of additional expenditures equals their
added benefit. We will call such reliance profit-maximizing reliance.
Some actors, however, may rely in a way that is profit-
diminishing. In the Blue Angels case, for example, Promoter might
spend an amount on advertising that was suboptimal even if
performance by the Blue Angels was perfectly insured, because she
miscalculates the effect of additional advertising. For example,
Producer might have an overoptimistic disposition, or she may simply
exercise poor judgment and make a bad call. We will call that portion
of beneficial reliance that is suboptimal even if the promisor's
performance was perfectly insured profit-diminishing reliance. Profit-
diminishing reliance will not increase the promisee's damages,
because such reliance will decrease rather than increase the
promisee's lost profits. Put differently, if the promisor performs
rather than breaches, the promisee's profits will be reduced by the
amount of profit-diminishing reliance. Therefore, if the promisor
promisee's damages by increasing her compensable costs. For example, suppose that in
the Blue Angels case, Promoter spends $50,000 on advertising, and has no other expenses
besides advertising and the Blue Angels' $100,000 fee. Suppose further that if the Blue
Angels give the concert, the proceeds of the concert will be $225,000. If the Blue Angels
cancel at the last moment, and their fee has not yet been paid, then to put Promoter where
she would have been if the concert had been performed, she must be awarded damages of
$125,000: if the concert had been performed, Promoter would have covered her $50,000
advertising expense and made a profit of $75,000 to boot. If Promoter is awarded as
damages only $75,000 for lost profit, she will have to eat the $50,000 advertising expenses,
and therefore will not be as well off as she would have been had the concert been
performed. Characteristically, however, expenses like the advertising are not a separate
element of damages. Instead, the promisee recovers these costs indirectly: The promisee's
damages will be based on the lost gross revenues minus any variable costs saved by virtue
of the promisor's breach (in this case $225,000 minus the $100,000 fee to the Blue Angels).
That measure will automatically compensate the promisee for the wasted costs she
incurred prior to breach.
July 2003]
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breaches, the damages that the promisee recovers must be
correspondingly reduced.'
Profit-diminishing reliance is presumably atypical, although not
unknown. We mention it here principally to make clear that even if
the promisee's beneficial reliance was perfectly insured by the
standard expectation measure, a rational, well-informed, and prudent
promisee would not engage in unlimited beneficial reliance. Instead,
the beneficial reliance of such a promisee will be constrained by a
natural economic limit.
(3) Necessary Reliance
A party to a contract often must incur some costs just to make
the contract work. For example, a buyer often must incur some costs
to get any benefit at all from the seller's performance. Thus, in the
Blue Angels case if Promoter is to get any benefit at all from her
contract, she must first incur the cost of renting a venue. Similarly, if
a buyer contracts to purchase a die press that requires a concrete
foundation, she cannot take delivery of the die press unless she first
incurs the cost of putting in the foundation. We call such costs
preparatory costs. Similarly, sellers often must incur certain costs to
render an agreed-upon performance. For example, assume that
Seller, a middleman, agrees to deliver 40,000 apples to Buyer at 25¢
an apple. To perform, Seller must incur the cost of buying 40,000
apples. We call such costs performance costs. We call preparatory
costs and performance costs, taken together, necessary reliance,
because but for the contract they would not be incurred, but once the
contract is made they must be incurred.
Necessary reliance may be viewed as only a special case of
beneficial reliance. Typically, however, beneficial reliance is
economically discretionary once the contract is made, while necessary
reliance is either not discretionary at all or discretionary only within
very narrow limits. For example, a seller normally cannot
significantly vary his performance costs in response to the buyer's rate
8. Reliance may be profit-diminishing regardless of the damages rule. In contrast,
whether reliance is profit-maximizing may depend on what damages rule is employed.
Under the standard expectation measure, reliance may be profit-maximizing even though
it takes no account of the probability of breach, because the promisee knows or has reason
to know that her damages will not depend on that probability. Under an overreliance
rule, on the other hand, a promisee who does not take the promisor's rate of breach into
account may be imprudent, because she would know or have reason to know that her
damages may be adjusted downward to reflect her overreliance. In this Article, we take
the standard expectation measure as a starting-point, and therefore we define profit-
maximizing to mean reliance that is profit-maximizing given that measure. As will be
seen, nothing substantive turns on this definition; it is adopted simply for ease of
exposition.
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of breach, because if he fails to incur performance costs he will be
unable to perform and will himself be in breach. Accordingly, in the
apples hypothetical, regardless of Buyer's rate of breach Seller must
purchase 40,000 apples at some point prior to the time for delivery.
In other words, generally speaking once a contract has been entered
into, the amount of the seller's performance costs is largely
unaffected by whether the seller treats the performance of the buyer
as insured or uninsured.
Similarly, a buyer generally cannot significantly vary the amount
of her preparatory costs, because if she does not incur such costs she
will lose the benefit of the contract and nevertheless will have to pay
the contract price or damages to the seller. In the Blue Angels case,
for example, if Promoter does not rent a venue prior to the concert,
she nevertheless will be required to pay the Blue Angels $75,000.9
It is true that the amount of preparatory costs may sometimes be
variable at the margin. For example, in the Blue Angels case
Promoter might be able to rent a better or worse venue, and in the
die press case the buyer might be able to build a better or worse
foundation. We regard this qualification as largely immaterial, for
two reasons.
First, often and perhaps even typically, the amount of
preparatory reliance will not practicably be variable: In many cases,
there is only one realistic choice (for example, if in the Blue Angels
case only one venue in the area is available for a rock concert at the
relevant time). In other cases, the quality of the commodity in which
the buyer must invest-a concert venue, a concrete foundation-
cannot be easily reduced below the otherwise-optimal quality without
reducing or even destroying the benefit of the contract.
Second, even where the quality of the commodity in which the
buyer must invest can be reduced below the level that would be
optimal except for the problem of overreliance, by hypothesis
reducing the expenditure on preparatory costs, to take account of the
9. Similarly, in Xavier-Yvonne the overreliance problem may figure in deciding how
much beneficial reliance Yvonne should engage in at the margin, but may not figure in
how much preparatory reliance she must engage in (for example, by expanding her
refrigeration capacity to store the new food units). Formally, one could assume that
Yvonne's reliance expenditures are equal to y + Y, where y is as above and Y is a fixed
cost that Yvonne must incur in order to do any amount of food ordering at all. Yvonne's
net income would then become p(x)Rp(y) + (I - p(x)Rnp(y) + I - p(x)D - K - y - Y. But
her first order condition in choosing how high to set y is still as in note 5-it remains
unchanged by the addition of Y. Our concept of necessary versus beneficial reliance is
closely related to the distinction between fixed and variable costs. It is also and perhaps
even more closely related to the distinction, drawn in L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr.,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 78 (1936), between
"essential reliance" (loosely, what we call necessary reliance) and "incidental reliance"
(loosely, beneficial reliance).
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issue of overreliance in this way, will result in a quality of preparation
that would be less than optimal if the issue of overreliance was put
aside. Observation suggests that generally speaking, the probability
of performance is very high and the probability of material breach is
very low. There is a good reason for this. Actors are very unlikely to
deal with promisors who have a high rate of material breach. For one
thing, reliability is important to most contracting actors, given the
need to coordinate elements of production and distribution. In
addition, as we show below, the expected value of damages based on
lost profits is much lower than perfect-world damages, so that the
value of performance will greatly exceed the value of damages for
nonperformance. Accordingly, promisors with more than a very low
rate of material breach are likely to be driven out of the market.
Assuming that the rate of material breach is very low and the rate of
substantial performance is very high, the expected cost of a
suboptimal investment in the quality of preparation will be very high,
while the expected cost of overreliance will be very low. Accordingly,
the social loss that would result from underinvesting in the quality of
preparation will normally swamp any social loss that would result
from not taking into account the possibility of breach.
Performance costs may also be variable at the margin, but for
reasons discussed in the following section, the variation of
performance costs to take account of the probability of breach is also
rarely likely to be efficient.
(4) Timing Costs
One set of contract-related costs falls into a zone between
necessary reliance, on the one hand, and beneficial reliance, on the
other. We call these timing costs. These are principally costs that will
result if a party delays the beginning of his performance to minimize
the losses that may follow if breach occurs.
Here is an example: Assume that a provider and a buyer have
entered into a contract-say a contract for the sale of apples or for
the construction of a building. Assume further that while the
provider must incur minimum performance costs to perform the
contract, he has some discretion when to begin incurring these costs.
For example, suppose that in the apples contract the provider can fill
the buyer's order on time either by purchasing apples soon after the
contract is made or by purchasing apples just prior to the time of
delivery. Or suppose that in the construction contract, the provider
can construct the building on time either by beginning right away or
by beginning later.
Under these assumptions, if the probability of the buyer's breach
is disregarded, then the provider will make a straightforward
efficiency decision on timing, based on such considerations as his
[Vol. 54
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forecast of future prices, the increased difficulty of completion if he
begins later rather than earlier, the cost of tying up capital if he begins
earlier rather than later, and so forth. The provider will also be
conscious of the fact that beginning performance early is a kind of
precaution, in the sense that the earlier the provider begins
performing, the more likely he will perform on time. If the provider
is rational and well informed, he will begin performance at the time,
T,, that is optimal given these kinds of considerations.
Now suppose that the probability of material breach by the
buyer is greater than zero. It is possible that total costs will be
minimized if the provider begins at time T2, which is later than T,
because if it becomes clear after T,, but before T2. that the buyer will
breach, the provider can forgo a wasteful investment in the costs of a
performance that may have only limited value if the buyer wrongfully
refuses to accept and pay for it. We call such a delay a timing cost,
because the provider's profits will always be reduced by beginning
performance at T, rather than T,, since by hypothesis the optimum
time for the provider to begin performance (not taking into account
the possibility of a breach by the purchaser) is T,, not T,
Other kinds of costs may also be deemed timing costs. For
example, assume the following facts in the apples case: The provider
has a window of time to purchase apples for resale to the buyer. The
optimal time for the provider to purchase apples for resale to the
buyer is T, and if the provider purchases the apples at that time he
will need to incur minimum performance costs (the cost of the apples)
of $18,000. The provider can instead pay $500 at T, for an option to
purchase apples for $18,000 at T (a later time). If the provider does
so and the buyer defaults, the losses under the contract will be less.
However, but for the risk of the buyer's breach, the provider should
purchase apples, rather than purchasing an option, at T, because if the
provider purchases the option and the buyer performs, the provider
will increase his costs from $18,000 to $18,500 without any
corresponding increase in the price paid by the buyer.
Nevertheless, the possibility of incurring (or forgoing) timing
costs of any sort will seldom lead to inefficient overreliance. For
example, assume that to reduce the possibility of the social costs that
will result if the buyer breaches after the provider has begun
performance, the provider delays the beginning of performance
beyond the time, T,, that would be efficient but for the buyer's
possible breach. Then there will be a possible efficiency gain, based
on the probability of wasted costs in the event of breach. There will
also be an efficiency loss, because by hypothesis in the absence of
breach it will be more costly for the provider to begin performance at
T2, and also because beginning at T, rather than T is a type of
precaution against the provider himself ending up in breach by
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
delaying performance too long. If, as we believe to be the case,
generally speaking the rate of substantial performance is very high
and the rate of material breach is very low, the efficiency losses from
such a delay will normally swamp the efficiency gains, so that timing
costs normally should not be incurred.
What if, instead of merely presenting a statistical probability of
breach, the buyer takes an action or makes a statement that renders it
uncertain that she will perform? Such cases are out of the realm of
overreliance: Under general principles of contract law, in these
circumstances the provider can demand reasonable assurance of
performance by the buyer. If such assurance is not forthcoming, the
provider can withhold further performance and bring suit for breach
of contract.
(5) Summary
The problem of overreliance does not apply to most kinds of
reliance: (i) Whether reliance is profit-maximizing or profit-
diminishing depends on efficiency considerations other than the
promisor's rate of breach. (ii) Assuming that the probability of
substantial performance is generally very high and the probability of
material breach is generally very low, necessary reliance can seldom
be efficiently varied in response to the probability of breach. (iii) The
same is true of preparatory reliance and timing costs. Therefore, for
most practical purposes the theory of overreliance concerns only
beneficial reliance. Accordingly, generally speaking in the balance of
this Article we will consider only whether the standard expectation
measure induces too much beneficial reliance.
B. In Most Contracts Cases, the Standard Expectation Measure Cannot
Provide an Incentive for Overreliance
In the previous Section we disaggregated reliance, partly to
facilitate the analysis of overreliance and partly to show that most
kinds of reliance other than beneficial reliance do not raise an
overreliance problem. In this Section we show that in three major
categories of contracts cases, which collectively account for most
contracts cases, inefficient beneficial overreliance normally cannot or
is highly unlikely to occur, because of institutional elements based on
the economics of contracting and the way in which the standard
expectation measure is actually administered. These categories are:
Cases in which the promisee's damages under the standard
expectation measure will not vary with changes in her costs: If a
promisee's damages under the standard expectation measure will not
vary with changes in her costs, the prospect of standard expectation
damages will not affect the level of the promisee's investment in costs.
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Cases in which the promisee's payoff from reliance does not
depend on whether the promisor performs: Where a promisee's
payoff from reliance does not depend on whether the promisor
performs, the efficient level of the promisee's investment in costs is
independent of the probability of breach by the promisor.
Cases where it would be inefficient for a promisee, in setting the
appropriate level of beneficial reliance, to take her counterparty's
probability of breach into account: Because the theory of
overreliance is based on efficiency, the theory is either inapplicable or
trumped in cases where an overreliance rule would be inefficient.
We now consider these categories in detail.
(1) Cases in Which the Promisee's Damages Under the Standard Expectation
Measure Will Not Vary with Changes in Her Costs
We begin with cases in which the prospect of expectation
damages is not an incentive for beneficial overreliance because the
promisee's damages under the standard expectation measure will not
vary with changes in her costs. When damages do not vary with
changes in costs, an incentive to overrely does not arise."
Much of the literature on overreliance suffers from the defect
that it takes expectation damages as a monolithic entity. Of course,
there is a general principle of expectation damages-put the injured
party in the position that she would have been in if the contract had
been performed. In the actual law of damages, however, the general
principle is instantiated in a number of specific rules based on various
types of categorization. The theory of overreliance must be
considered in light of these specific rules.
One way in which expectation-damage rules are categorized is by
the construction of formulas that apply the general principle of
expectation damages to particular kinds of cases, such as breach by a
seller and breach by a buyer.
Another kind of categorization divides expectation damages into
general and consequential damages. General damages are the
damages that normally follow from a particular kind of breach,
regardless of the particular circumstances of the parties. A
contracting party is normally liable for all general damages that result
from his breach. For example, if a seller fails to deliver under a
contract for the sale of goods, the buyer-regardless of her
circumstances-normally incurs general damages equal to any excess
of the market price of the goods over the contract price.
Consequential damages are the damages that result only from the
particular circumstances of the parties. For example, in case of a
seller's breach of a contract for the sale of goods, depending on the
10. See supra note 5.
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circumstances, the buyer may lose an expected profit on resale of the
goods. Under the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, a contracting
party is normally liable for consequential damages that result from his
breach only if the damages were reasonably foreseeable at the time
the contract was made."
Against that background, we now consider how the various
categorical rules of expectation damages impact on beneficial reliance
by sellers and buyers.
(a) Sellers
In the overwhelming majority of contracts, one party is required
to provide a commodity (using that term in its broadest sense, to
include physical goods, intangibles, real property, and services), while
the other party is required only to pay cash (either immediately or
over time). We will call a contracting party who is required to
provide a commodity a seller, and a party who is required only to pay
cash for a commodity a buyer. We will first show that except in
outlying cases, the prospect of damages under the standard
expectation measure cannot provide a seller with an incentive to
overrely, because a seller's expectation damages normally do not vary
with his costs.
Consider, for example, a seller's general damages for breach by
the buyer. Two basic formulas are employed to calculate such
damages.
The first formula is K - R, where K is the contract price that the
buyer agreed to pay for a commodity, and R is the replacement price
that the seller can realize by disposing of the commodity in a
replacement sale. (R can be either the market price of the relevant
commodity or the actual resale price.) 2
The second formula has two, normally equivalent, expressions.
The first expression is P + C,, where P equals the contract price minus
the seller's total variable costs for performing the contract, and C
equals the portion of variable costs incurred by the seller prior to the
breach. (In effect, this formula awards the seller his expected profit
and his costs incurred.) The second expression is K - C,, where K
equals the contract price and C, equals the variable costs remaining to
be incurred by the seller at the time of breach. The two expressions
are normally algebraically and economically equivalent.
Under either of the two basic formulas, a seller's expectation
damages normally cannot vary with his costs.
11. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854).
12. We put to one side, throughout this Article, wrinkles on the formulas that concern
payments made prior to breach. These wrinkles do not affect our analysis.
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This is most readily apparent where the seller's damages are
measured by the first formula, K - R. In this formula K (the contract
price) is fixed, and R (the market or resale price) is invariant to the
seller's costs. Accordingly, an increase in the seller's costs will not
increase his damages, and indeed will decrease his net gain.
Contracts in which the seller's expectation damages are measured
under this formula therefore cannot provide an incentive to a seller to
inefficiently increase his costs by overrelying.
The same result obtains where the seller's damages are measured
under the second formula.
Under the first expression of that formula, P + C,, an increase in
the seller's variable costs drives up C, (variable costs incurred by the
seller prior to the breach), but typically drives down P (contract price
minus total variable costs) dollar for dollar. As a result, this
expression of the formula does not provide an incentive to the seller
to increase his costs.
Under the alternative expression of the formula, K - C,, the
contract price, K, is fixed. Although an increase in the seller's
variable costs prior to the time of breach drives down C, and
therefore drives up the seller's damages, it also typically drives down
the seller's profit, dollar for dollar. Therefore, this expression also
provides no incentive for a seller to overrely.
It might sometimes happen that by incurring costs earlier rather
than later, the seller can decrease its total costs. Spending earlier may
allow the seller to plan better, lock in better prices, and so forth. In
such cases, the timing of the seller's costs might increase net revenues,
rather than decreasing net revenues dollar-for-dollar. However, as
we showed above in Section A(4), a rule that put pressure on a seller
to postpone his performance until he could determine whether the
buyer would be in breach would probably be inefficient. Such a rule
would often require a seller to incur more costs than would otherwise
be optimal. Moreover, the risk that the seller will himself end up in
breach increases in tandem with the postponement of performance.
True, a few cases might occur in which (1) earlier performance would
lead to higher damages than later performance under the formula K -
C,, and (2) later performance would be more efficient, factoring in the
optimality of the time at which costs are incurred, on the one hand,
and probability of breach, on the other. However, we believe that
such cases are outliers that can safely be disregarded for present
purposes.
Of course, a seller who stands to make consequential profits from
a sale may be able to increase his expected profits, and therefore his
damages, by increasing his beneficial reliance. However, "Sellers
rarely suffer compensable consequential damages. A buyer's usual
default is failure to pay. In normal circumstances, the disappointed
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seller will be able to sell to another, borrow to replace the breaching
buyer's promised payment, or otherwise adjust its affairs to avoid
consequential loss.""
In short, the prospect of expectation damages normally cannot
give a seller an incentive to engage in beneficial overreliance-that is,
an incentive to incur more costs than would be efficient considering
the buyer's probability of breach. First, the formulas for calculating a
seller's general damages normally provide sellers with no incentive
for increasing their costs. Second, sellers normally do not incur
consequential damages. Accordingly, overreliance normally cannot
be a problem for half of all contracting parties, that is, sellers. And,
as we will show in the next few Sections, overreliance also either
cannot be-or is highly unlikely to be-a problem for most buyers.
(b) Buyers
Since sellers normally cannot overrely, we now shift our focus to
buyers.
(i) Buyers Who Have No Compensable Consequential Damages
Buyers, like sellers, will normally incur general damages as a
result of a breach. As in the case of sellers, the general damages of
buyers for nonperformance by sellers are normally measured by one
of two formulas. The first formula is R - K, where R is the price of a
replacement transaction and K is the contract price. (Here again, the
price of a replacement transaction can be measured either by the
market price for the contracted-for commodity at the time of breach,
or by an actual replacement transaction, such as the cost of cover or
the price charged by a replacement service-provider). The second
formula is V - V, where V is the market value of the performance
P rP
that was promised, and V, is the market value of the performance that
was rendered. 4
Under either formula, the buyer's gain from general damages
will not be increased by an increase in his costs. This is most readily
apparent in the case of the first formula, R - K, because neither R
(the cost of a replacement transaction) nor K (the contract price) is
affected by changes in a buyer's costs. The same result also holds true
of the second formula, V - V., because both Vp (the market value ofP
the performance promised) and V (the market value of the
performance rendered) are measured independently of the buyer's
costs.
13. U.C.C. § 2-710 prelim. cmt. 2 (Prop. Amends. 2001).
14. The second formula is commonly referred to as the diminished-value measure. As
in the case of the seller's damages, there are wrinkles in the formulas, but they can be
ignored for present purposes.
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Accordingly, as to buyers who have only compensable general
damages, the standard expectation measure normally does not-and
indeed cannot-provide an incentive for overreliance. Many buyers
fall into this category; that is, many buyers have no compensable
consequential damages. This will be true, for example, whenever a
buyer has no consequential damages at all, or when the buyer's
consequential damages were not reasonably foreseeable by the seller
at the time the contract was made.
In addition, a seller's breach will seldom result in consequential
damages to a buyer if the buyer is a consumer. Consumers normally
purchase commodities for personal consumption and use, rather than
to make a profit. Accordingly, in most cases a consumer's
consequential damages consist only of loss of personal satisfaction. In
a perfect world, lost satisfaction might count in expectation damages.
Under the law of contracts, it normally does not."5 True, scenarios
can be constructed in which a consumer will have consequential
damages. For example, a consumer who contracts for a custom-made
yacht might suffer consequential reliance damages if she orders
custom-made fittings that cannot be used for any other yacht, and the
seller fails to deliver. This kind of scenario, however, is hardly an
everyday occurrence. Moreover, even in this kind of scenario, under
the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale the consumer's consequential
damages will not be compensable unless at the time the contract was
made the seller was on notice that the consumer planned to engage in
reliance of this kind. 6
(ii) Nonmaterial Breach
Even a commercial buyer, who purchases to make a profit, will
normally have consequential damages only if a breach is material.
For example, suppose Contractor agrees with Owner to build a
commercial building to certain specifications, the building to be
completed and ready for occupancy on July 1. Contractor
substantially completes the building by July 1, but the construction
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981).
16. Of course, while this limit on damages reduces the buyer's incentive to overrely, it
also reduces the seller's incentive to take precautions against breach.
We put to one side problems of liability for harm caused by a defective product to the
person or property of a consumer or bystander. Such harms are typically not
recompensed by expectation damages, and as far as we are aware it has not been
suggested in the overreliance literature that a consumer's or bystander's remedies for such
harms should be affected by whether the consumer or bystander has organized her life to
take into account the probability that an injury might result from a product that has no
apparent defects. Of course, consumers may occasionally suffer economic harm from
product defects, but that is consistent with our position that consumers usually do not have
consequential damages.
fails to meet specifications in certain nonmaterial respects-some of
the carpeting is not the specified color and a few office doors do not
close properly. If the defects do not prevent Owner from taking
immediate occupancy and can be remedied either by a money
allowance or by contracting with a third party to make repairs,
Owner's damages will be measured by the difference in value
between the building as contracted for and the building as delivered,
or by the cost of getting repairs made. In either case, Owner's
investment in beneficial reliance will not be wasted as a result of the
breach.
To generalize, what matters under the theory of overreliance is
not the prospect of breach as such, but the prospect of material
breach. Accordingly, a buyer can efficiently invest in beneficial
reliance without regard to the probability that the seller will breach to
the extent that this probability concerns only minor breaches. If, as
we believe to be the case, the rate of material breach is generally very
low, then generally speaking overreliance will not be a problem. Put
more accurately, taking contracting as a whole, the problem of
overreliance will not be economically significant.
(2) Cases in Which the Promisee's Payoff from Beneficial Reliance Does Not
Depend on Whether the Promisor Performs
We have shown that sellers normally cannot overrely, and that
buyers frequently cannot overrely, partly as a result of the actual rules
of expectation damages, as opposed to the general principle of
expectation damages. In this section and the next, we show that
overreliance is often unlikely even when it is theoretically possible.
To begin with, in many cases the promisee's payoff from
beneficial reliance does not depend on whether the promisor
performs. In such cases the promisee will not be induced to overrely
by the prospect that her damages are insured.
Here is the reason that is so: The concept of overreliance
primarily concerns cases in which a party-now, we can see, a
buyer-overinvests in beneficial reliance. The buyer overinvests in
the sense that she behaves as if the seller's performance is insured,
when in fact the seller has a positive rate of breach. Accordingly, the
buyer cannot overrely if the payoff from beneficial reliance does not
depend on whether the seller performs. In such cases the efficient
level of the buyer's investment in costs is independent of the
probability of seller's breach. To put this differently, in such cases the
buyer will reap the same return on her investment in beneficial
reliance whether the seller performs or breaches.'7 (Of course, the
17. In the Xavier-Yvonne example, consider Yvonne's choice of y in note 5. If the
payoff from reliance expenditure y does not depend on whether Xavier performs, then
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buyer may engage in profit-diminishing reliance, but that has to do
with the buyer's business acumen, not with a faulty assumption that
the seller's performance is insured.) We discuss two such cases: those
in which a performance identical to that which the seller has promised
is readily available on the market and those in which the buyer's
investment in reliance will hold its value even if the seller breaches.
(a) Cases in Which an Identical Performance Is Readily
Available on the Market
Where a performance identical to that which a seller has
promised is readily available on the market, that availability insures
that the buyer's investment in beneficial reliance will be protected
even if the seller breaches. For example, a buyer of wheat (or any
other relatively homogeneous commodity) cannot overrely. If the
seller breaches, the buyer can always buy replacement wheat on the
market and put that wheat to the use planned for the seller's wheat.
Similarly, if a seller agrees to remodel a building for a buyer, all of the
buyer's beneficial reliance (such as ordering custom-designed
furniture for the building) will be protected, even if the seller
breaches, if the buyer can reasonably expect that in the event of
breach she can procure a substitute contractor to complete the
remodeling on time.
(b) Cases in Which Reliance Holds Its Value After Breach
The payoff from an investment in beneficial reliance is also
independent of the seller's performance where the investment will
hold all or almost all of its value in an alternative use even if the seller
breaches. (For example, suppose that if Xavier breaches, Yvonne can
re-sell the food to other restaurants at her cost, with only very minor
transaction costs.) In such cases, the standard expectation measure
does not provide an incentive for inefficient overreliance. On the
contrary, the buyer should rely as if the seller's performance was
certain, because her reliance will have the same value whether the
seller breaches or performs. More generally, in such cases there can
be no overreliance, because the buyer's damages are invariant to her
costs. That is, if a buyer's reliance holds its value after breach, the
reliance will not factor into the buyer's expectation damages, either
directly or indirectly.
R'p(y) = R'np(y), so damages do not vary as y varies. As explained in note 5, in such
circumstances an incentive to overrely does not occur.
18. See George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225,
1319 (1994).
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(3) Cases in Which It Would Be Inefficient for a Buyer to Take the Seller's
Rate of Breach into Account in Calibrating Her Reliance
In some cases, even if neither of the first two conditions hold, it
would be inefficient for a buyer to take the seller's rate of breach into
account in determining her level of reliance. We discuss three such
cases: those in which the buyer's reliance is lumpy, those in which the
buyer's reliance consists of entering into coordinated contracts, and
those in which the seller's probability of breach is very low.
(a) Lumpy Reliance
To begin with, it will be inefficient to take the seller's probability
of breach into account where the buyer's beneficial reliance occurs in
lumps that cannot be scaled down at the margin to take account of
that probability. For example, assume that in the Seafarer
hypothetical, Charterer cannot charter the yacht out upon its
completion unless she has purchased various types of fittings and
other equipment, including a radar, in advance. Suppose that a radar
for the yacht, which costs $15,000, must be purchased two months in
advance; that Charterer will therefore lose two months of net
revenues, equal to $100,000, if she does not order a radar until the
yacht is delivered; that the probability of Boatmaker's breach is ten
percent; and that the radar would fall in value by twenty-five percent
if Boatmaker breaches and Charterer must resell it on the market.
Since Charterer will lose $100,000 if she does not purchase the radar
in advance, and since she cannot purchase less than all of a radar,
even under the theory of overreliance Charterer should not take the
probability of Boatmaker's breach into account in incurring the cost
of a radar.
Similarly, suppose that under Coast Guard rules the Seafarer
cannot be operated without ten life preservers on board, and life
preservers, which cost $100 apiece, must be ordered four weeks in
advance. It is then efficient for Charterer to purchase ten life
preservers in advance, rather than nine, because nine life preservers
do her no good at all.
The lumpiness constraint can apply even to a collection of
disparate items. For example, suppose that to charter out the
Seafarer, the yacht must be equipped with ten different items for the
galley-a range, a set of dishes, a set of cutlery, and so forth-and
that all these items must be ordered in advance at a total cost of
$30,000. Here too it would be inefficient for Charterer to calibrate
her beneficial reliance to the probability of Boatmaker's breach by
purchasing fewer than ten items-for example, by forgoing purchase
of the range, the dishes, or the cutlery. Similarly, it would make no
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economic sense to order furnishings for the galley but not to order the
life preservers and the radar.'9
(b) Coordinated Contracts
Often a buyer must coordinate a number of contracts to create or
further an enterprise. For example, a film producer may need to
make advance contracts with ten key artists to launch a movie-a
writer, a director, five actors, a photographer, a composer, and a film
editor. Even if the rate of breach of each of the ten artists is ten
percent, if production could not be started unless all ten artists had
been signed to contracts, and if the market is such that each artist
must be signed well in advance of production, then it would be
inefficient for the producer to reduce his reliance by making contracts
with less than ten artists. To generalize this point, whenever a
venture requires multiple advance contracts to get off the ground, it is
inefficient to enter into less than all the contracts even though there is
a positive probability of breach for each contract.
19. The lumpiness constraint assumes that beneficial reliance is justifiable. In some
cases, that is not true. For instance, suppose in the Seafarer example it would cost $90,000
to outfit the boat in advance. If Boatmaker does not breach, Charterer will receive net
revenues of $100,000 for the first two months. Under the standard expectation measure, if
Boatmaker breaches by making delivery two months late, he must pay $100,000 in
damages. Given these expectation damages, Charterer might incur costs without regard to
Boatmaker's probability of breach. However, if the probability of breach is fifteen
percent, then the expected social return from the $90,000 investment is only $85,000, and
under the theory of overreliance Charterer should not order anything in advance, unless
the investment would hold most or all of its value in the event of Boatmaker's breach.
Although such overreliance is possible, it is not terribly likely, nor a great concern.
Note in this example that if outfitting the boat cost more than $100,000, the Charterer
would not make the investment even with ordinary damages, while if the investment was
under $85,000, it would be unobjectionable. It is only if the lumpy reliance falls into the
intermediate range that a problem exists. As the probability of breach decreases, this
intermediate range narrows. Even in the example, with a high fifteen percent rate of
breach, the expected net social loss from the overreliance is only $5,000 ($90,000 -
$85,000). As the range of possible overreliance narrows, with a decreasing probability of
breach, the range of possible social loss will similarly narrow. Moreover, the $90,000
investment would probably hold most or all of its value in the event of breach, thereby
making the investment efficient to undertake in any event.
It is also possible that a promisee could scale down the level of her investment in an
item of lumpy reliance below the otherwise-optimal level, to take into account the
probability of breach. For example, if an otherwise-optimal radar would cost $15,000,
Boatmaker might buy, say, a $14,000 radar instead. However, if the rate of material
breach is very low, then the expected cost of purchasing a less-than-otherwise-optimal
radar would be much higher than the expected cost of purchasing the optimal $15,000
radar, even considering the probability of breach.
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(c) Seller's Probability of Material Breach Is Very Low
If the seller's probability of material breach is very low, it would
normally be inefficient to take that probability into account in
calibrating the efficient amount of beneficial reliance; by definition
the probability is not significant. Furthermore, just for that reason
the cost of determining exactly how much reliance would be efficient
would normally exceed any resulting gains. In such cases, efficiency
therefore requires the buyer to treat the seller's performance as if it
were certain, even if it was marginally less than certain.
(Suppose the seller's probability of material breach is very high.
In that case, buyers are unlikely to contract with the seller. Parties
contract not only to shift risks, but also to enable them to make
reliable plans. Many contracts are based in significant part on the
buyer's need to coordinate production or distribution by ensuring
control over inputs. If, in such a case, a contracted-for input is not
timely delivered, the buyer's entire production may be seriously
disrupted. Few buyers who contract on this basis are willing to
substitute the prospect of future damages for the timely delivery of
the input. As stated in the Comment to the Uniform Commercial
Code, "the fact [is] that the essential purpose of a contract between
commercial [actors] is actual performance and [such actors] do not
bargain merely for.., a promise plus the right to win a lawsuit and
that a continuing sense of reliance and security that the promised
performance will be forthcoming when due, is an important feature of
the bargain."2 ' )
(4) Summary
Generally speaking: (1) A seller normally cannot overrely. (2)
A buyer normally cannot overrely if she will have no consequential
damages, or is a consumer, or if the probability of the seller's material
breach is generally very low, or if the seller's performance can be
readily replaced on the market, or if the buyer's reliance will hold its
value on breach, or is lumpy, or involves coordinated contracts.
Overreliance is also unlikely to be a problem in the case of particular
sellers who have a very low rate of breach, because in such cases a
buyer can treat the seller's performance as virtually assured.
Similarly, overreliance is unlikely to be a problem in the case of
sellers who have a very high rate of breach, because few buyers will
contract with such sellers. Since at least one of these conditions will
usually be satisfied in most cases, the likelihood of overreliance seems
very small. The mere possibility that overreliance may occasionally
occur does not provide a good reason either to deem the standard
20. U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (2002).
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expectation measure to be inefficient or to graft an overreliance rule
onto that measure.
Il. The Standard Expectation Measure Does Not Fully
Insure a Promisee's Reliance
In Part II, we showed that as a result of institutional elements
based on the economics of contracting and the way in which the
standard expectation measure is actually instantiated in specific rules,
overreliance is very unlikely to often occur. In this Part, we consider
two further institutional elements that make overreliance unlikely:
litigation risks and litigation costs. These elements bear on the
incentives provided by damage measures in a variety of ways. We
focus on the promisee's incentives to rely, but we also consider the
promisor's incentives to take precaution against breach.
A central tenet of the theory of overreliance is that under the
standard expectation measure a promisee will inefficiently fail to take
account of the promisor's rate of breach in determining the level of
her investment in beneficial reliance, because that measure fully
insures the promisee's reliance. This tenet is expressed in statements
like, "Because the expectation measure guarantees B [the promisee]
full compensation whether S [the promisor] performs or not, it
generates the moral hazard problem that arises under any full
insurance scheme, for it means that B can ignore the risk that S's
nonperformance might leave B's reliance expenditures wasted."2' Or,
"[E]xpectation damages allow B to capture all of the upside potential
of his reliance without making him bear any of the downside
potential ... ,22
When institutional factors are taken into account, however, this
central tenet is incorrect in some cases and exaggerated in others. At
the time a promisee determines the level of her investment in
beneficial reliance, she cannot rationally expect to be fully insured by
standard expectation damages. On the contrary, she knows that she
will bear much or even all of the downside potential of such reliance.
To begin with, in deciding how much to invest in beneficial
reliance, what matters to the promisee is not the damages that she
would receive in a perfect world without transaction costs and
information costs, but the damages that she will receive in the actual
world. To put this differently, what matters to the promisee is the net
present expected value of damages at the time she makes her reliance
decision (hereafter, the expected value of damages). In determining
21. Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 365, 376-77 (1989).
22. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN L. REV. 481,
494 (1996).
the expected value of damages, the promisee must discount the
damages that she would receive in a perfect world to reflect litigation
risks and litigation costs.
Litigation risks consist of the risk of error by the law-finder or
the fact-finder, and the possibility that the promisor may successfully
establish a defense to the promisee's claim. Damages based on
beneficial reliance present particularly high litigation risks. Typically,
such damages consist in whole or in part of lost profits, which are
both difficult to measure and subject to special defenses, such as the
principle of Hadley v. Baxendale and the requirement of certainty.3
Moreover, because lost profits are unliquidated, the court may not
award pre-judgment interest, so that the value of a future recovery
may also need to be discounted by the time value of money. Another
possible litigation risk is that the promisor may prove to be judgment-
proof-indeed, breach may often be due in part to the promisor's
financial difficulties.
Given all these factors, it seems safe to assume that at the time a
risk-neutral promisee invests in beneficial reliance, the expected
value of damages based on beneficial reliance is unlikely to often
exceed seventy to eighty percent of perfect-world damages, even
without regard to litigation costs. The expected value of such
damages will be significantly less if, as is likely, the promisee is risk-
averse. In effect, therefore, the promisee is likely to co-insure at least
twenty to thirty percent of her beneficial reliance. As Cooter points
out, deductibles "in effect divide liability between insured and
insurer, giving the insured incentive to take more precaution than he
would have otherwise."24 The same is true of co-insurance. 5
(This discussion of litigation risk has a complication. It is
possible that the extent of the litigation-risk discount is partly a
function of the degree of reliance. Two opposing stories can be told.
On the one hand, greater reliance may lead to more relationship-
specific spending by the promisee, the effect on which of breach may
23. It is theoretically possible that the promisee's actual damages would be more than
perfect expectation damages, rather than less. If the chances of overly high damages were
as great as the chances of overly low damages, the promisee would not discount for
litigation risk. However, we do not regard that possibility as realistic, because courts have
historically tended to be very conservative in awarding damages based on lost profits. For
example, the requirement of certainty and the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale are always
used to cut back a promisee's recovery, never to expand a promisee's recovery.
24. Cooter, supra note 3, at 39.
25. We can make the point in terms of the Xavier-Yvonne example. Suppose that
Yvonne can expect to recover only a fraction r of damages D, where I - r is the fraction
expected to be lost due to litigation risks. The first order condition for Yvonne's choice of
y then becomes p(x)R'p(y) + (1 - p(x))R'np(y) + r*D'(y)) = 1. This is identical to the
optimal choice of y only where the D'(y) term disappears. Thus, the smaller r is, the closer
this condition will approach that giving rise to the optimal choice.
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be especially hard to measure. In such cases, the litigation-risk
discount would increase with increased reliance, and would do even
more to discourage overreliance. On the other hand, increased
reliance may lead to more concrete, observable damages in case of
breach, thereby decreasing the degree of litigation risk. In such cases,
the litigation-risk discount would decrease, and would do less to
discourage overreliance. Indeed, if this effect occurs litigation risk
would do less to reduce overreliance than we have suggested, because
promisees would have a strengthened incentive to increase reliance
expenditures, since doing so would increase the chances that a court
will be able to measure and award damages in the event of breach.
Accordingly, if this effect occurs there would be two opposing
tendencies: the litigation risk's very existence, which reduces the
incentive to overrely, and the reduction of litigation risk with
increased reliance, which would increase the incentive to overrely. If
the latter effect outweighs the former it would lead to a greater
overreliance problem than if there were no litigation risk.26)
In addition to the element of co-insurance, the promisee knows
that she will have to deduct, from any future recovery, the amount of
her litigation costs, such as attorney's fees and the value of her own
time." On the basis of casual empiricism, the minimum legal fee for
even a relatively straightforward commercial contract case would
likely be around $10,000, and the minimum fee for a complex
commercial contract case would not be much less than $50,000 to
$100,000. Indeed, a partner in a New York boutique litigation firm
told us that his firm's minimum fee for complex high-stakes
commercial contract litigation would seldom be much less than $1
million, based strictly on billable hours. In effect, litigation costs are
like a variable deductible whose amount depends on the complexity
26. We are indebted to Omri Ben-Shahar for this point. The point can be made more
precisely in terms of the extension to the Xavier-Yvonne example in the previous
footnote. Now suppose Yvonne expects to recover r(y)D(y) of damages, where r is a
function of y. In the first order condition the damage term, originally D'(y), then rD'(y),
now becomes rD'(y) + r'(y)D(y). If r'(y) < 0, that is, if an increase in y leads to greater
litigation risk, then litigation risk does even more to reduce overreliance, as it makes the
change-in-damages term even smaller. Indeed, if rD'(y) < -r'(y)D, it could even lead to
underreliance. However, if r'(y) > 0, then the reduction of the damage term caused by r is
lessened. Still, so long as r'(y) < (I - r)D'(y)/D(y), overreliance is still less in the presence
of litigation risk than if there were no such risk.
27. This may not be true where the contract includes a provision that if suit is brought
under the contract, the losing party pays the fees of the winning party. However, most
contracts do not contain such a provision. Moreover, even when such a provision is
included, it is risky to rely on it, because a party who brings suit and loses must absorb his
losses under the contract, his own attorney's fees, and the other party's attorney's fees.
Therefore, such a provision will have little impact unless the promisee has a very high level
of confidence that if she sues without settling, she will prevail in court, while if she settles,
the amount of the settlement will include her litigation expenses.
of the case and other factors, such as customary hourly rates. If the
promisee's damages are less than her litigation costs, then the
promisee may be unable to bring suit, and the effect is as if the
contract was governed by a no-damages rule. As a first
approximation, under a no-damages rule the overreliance problem is
eliminated." (We do not deny that cases whose expected value is less
than the litigation costs may nevertheless have a settlement value.
Such cases may get settled informally, without the aid of lawyers-
either on a basis that the parties deem equitable, or out of
reputational concerns, or because the promisor as well as the
promisee must pay litigation costs and therefore will be anxious to
avoid litigation. However, the chance that a case may have a
settlement value is a far cry from insurance, and in any event the
settlement value under these circumstances is unlikely to be heavily
controlled by the standard expectation measure.)
If litigation costs are fixed irrespective of the level of damages,
then if the costs are low enough that it still pays to sue, these costs will
not affect the reliance decision-they are a fixed cost, and do not
affect decisions on the margin." However, litigation costs typically
are not fixed relative to the size of damages. As the stakes get higher,
the costs of litigation are likely to rise, because the more money that
is at stake, the more a promisee will be willing to invest. Litigation
costs will tend to rise much less steeply than the expected value of
damages. Therefore, litigation costs will have the effect of
downward-sloping co-insurance. If suit can be brought at all, the
prospective recovery must be discounted by those extra costs as well
as by litigation risks." As a result, even in cases where a prospective
28. In Xavier-Yvonne, suppose Yvonne must incur a fixed cost L to collect damages.
Then her expected net income becomes p(x)Rp(y) + (1 -p(x)Rnp(y) + (I -p(x))(D - L) -
K - y. The first order condition for her choice of y is unchanged from that in note 5-the
L term drops out because it does not vary with y. However, if D < L, then presumably
Yvonne would not choose to sue to collect damages, and hence the damage term would
drop out of net income entirely-which leaves Yvonne with the proper incentive in
choosing y. For more on a no-damages rule, see infra Part IV.A.
29. In the Xavier-Yvonne example, one can see this point on the basis of the formulas
in the previous footnote. The first order condition is unchanged by the introduction of
fixed litigation costs, L. If D > L, L does not affect Yvonne's decision.
30. We can make the point algebraically. Let D, be damages at a lower level of
reliance and D2 damages at a higher level. Then D2 - D1 is how much damages would
increase with greater reliance in the absence of litigation costs-the source of the
overreliance incentive. Now, suppose that the promisee only collects a fraction A of
damages, with 7 - A going to her lawyer. This fraction may change as D changes, with a
smaller fraction going to the lawyer (i.e., A rising) as D increases. Then, 2AD, is how much
the promisee receives at low reliance, and 22 D2 is how much she receives at high reliance,
with A2 > 2. How do expected damages change as reliance increases? The absolute
amount that the lawyer receives does increase. That is, (1 - 4)D, > (1 - 2,)(D). A little
algebraic manipulation then reveals that D2 - D, > 2D 2 - AD,. The left-hand side is the
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recovery will likely exceed the litigation costs, the promisee will
effectively co-insure a very large proportion of her beneficial reliance,
often much more than fifty percent. For example, if the prospective
recovery is $200,000, and the litigation costs for a case of that amount
is $110,000, then the present net expected value of the recovery is
around $50,000 ($200,000 minus $110,000 in litigation costs and
around $40,000 (twenty percent of $200,000) for litigation risk.
Of course, when the promisee decides how much to invest in
beneficial reliance she may not know exactly the amount of her
litigation expenses upon breach by the promisor. She may, however,
have at least a rough idea. In any event, she will know that litigation
is extremely expensive and that the present value of a recovery for
breach may well be less than, or only somewhat more than, the costs
of litigation. Once she knows that, she knows that her reliance will be
either completely uninsured or only marginally insured by the
standard expectation measure, and she will be unlikely to overrely,
either at all or significantly, even in those few cases where
overreliance could potentially occur.
In short, even in cases where overreliance could potentially
occur, it is not true-as the theory of overreliance assumes-that a
promisee's beneficial reliance is fully insured by the standard
expectation measure. On the contrary, expenditures on beneficial
reliance that would generate damages less than litigation costs-and
litigation costs can run very, very high-are likely to be effectively
uninsured, and even damages in excess of the litigation costs will be
significantly co-insured by the promisee. These deductible and co-
insurance elements dramatically scale down the incentive to overrely
in those limited number of cases in which overreliance can occur. To
put this differently, considering the co-insurance and deductible
elements, and the fact that most actors are risk-averse, even in the
residual cases in which overreliance could potentially occur, it is
highly implausible that the standard expectation measure would often
lead a promisee to invest in beneficial reliance without regard to the
promisor's rate of breach.
We cannot leave this Part without noting the incentive effect of
the promisee's litigation risks and costs on the promisor. After all,
the promisee's litigation risks and costs could reduce the promisee's
incentive to overrely at the cost of reducing the promisor's incentive
to take precautions against breach. As we have seen, the standard
expectation measure provides the proper incentive to the promisor.
Accordingly, to the extent that litigation risks and costs reduce the
increase in damages received in the absence of litigation costs. The right-hand side is the
increase in net damages received by the promisee in the presence of litigation costs. The
latter is less than the former, so the incentive to overrely is decreased.
amount the promisor can expect to pay in damages, those risks and
costs also lessen the promisor's incentive to take precautions against
breach.
However, the promisor's own litigation costs have the opposite
effect. To the degree that the promisor expects to become involved
in litigation if he breaches, litigation costs increase the costs that the
promisor will bear after breaching, above what he actually pays to the
promisee in damages. These increased expected costs tend to
increase the incentive to take precaution against breach.
Accordingly, there are two contrasting effects: the promisee's
litigation risks and costs weaken the promisor's incentives to take
precaution against breach, but the promisor's litigation costs
strengthen those incentives. To the extent that the two roughly
balance out, then the incentive effects of the standard expectation
measure on the promisor's incentives may remain relatively
unchanged.' After factoring in litigation risk and costs, therefore,
although the standard expectation measure as actually experienced
gives little or no incentive for the promisee to overrely, it may still
provide roughly the right incentive for the promisor to take
precaution against breach.
IV. The Costs of Modifying the Standard
Expectation Measure to Prevent Overreliance
Would Probably Far Exceed the Benefits
In Part II, we showed that the theory of overreliance does not
cast significant doubt on the efficiency of the standard expectation
measure, because the problem of overreliance is limited to a small
number of residual cases by virtue of institutional considerations,
such as the economics of contracting and the way that expectation
damages are actually measured. In Part III, we showed that even in
the residual cases where overreliance could potentially occur, as a
result of litigation risks and costs the standard expectation measure
provides limited or no insurance to the promisee. When combined,
these considerations drastically reduce, if they do not entirely
eliminate, the concern that the standard expectation measure
produces an economically significant frequency of overreliance. In
this Part, we will assume that overreliance does occur at least
31. If Xavier incurs a net cost of L in a suit for damages, but as a result of litigation
risk Xavier can expect to pay out only a fraction r of damages to Yvonne, his net income is
K-x- (1 -p(x))(rD + L). Then his first order condition for choosing x becomes p'(x)(rD
+ L) = 1. This yields the optimal choice ofx if rD + L = Rp(y*) - Rnp(y*). Thus, if the co-
insurance elements discussed above tend to lower D below the standard expectation
measure by the percentage r, the L term may serve to raise D back closer to the proper
level.
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occasionally. We proceed on the premise that in these remaining
cases some promisees may believe that their damages on breach will
exceed the minimum cost of litigation, so that they will capture all the
upside of their beneficial reliance while the promisee will subsidize
some percentage of the downside. We ask what, if anything, should
be done about these cases.
One way to eliminate the incentive to overrely in these cases is to
make the promisee's damages invariant to the amount of her reliance.
Consider again Xavier and Yvonne. Recall that Yvonne's incentive
to overrely arises because increasing her beneficial reliance up to the
point where it becomes value-diminishing increases her potential
profits and, correspondingly, her damages in the event of breach, so
that her beneficial reliance is partially insured. In contrast, if the
amount of the damages that Yvonne would receive upon breach were
to remain invariant with respect to her level of reliance, then her
incentive to overrely would disappear.32
Liquidated-damages provisions may have this effect. Under such
provisions, a contractually determined amount must be paid to the
promisee in the event of breach by the promisor. Because the
amount is set in the contract, damages do not vary based upon how
much the promisee actually chooses to rely or upon how much the
promisee is actually damaged by the breach. Because the incentive to
overrely disappears if the damage measure is invariant with respect to
the actual level of reliance, a liquidated-damages provision may
eliminate the overreliance problem.33 Thus, a liquidated-damages
provision potentially can get both the breach and the reliance
incentives right.
However, if the liquidated amount is too low, the incentive to
take precautions against breach will be too low, while if the liquidated
amount is too high, the incentive to take precautions against breach
will be too great. Furthermore, Richard Craswell has pointed out
that liquidated damages will give the correct incentives for reliance
only if the promisee correctly estimates the promisor's probability of
breach.' If the promisee misestimates that probability, then
liquidated damages will lead to too little reliance if she overestimates
the chances of breach and too much reliance if she underestimates
them. Similarly, liquidated damages will give the correct incentives
for precaution only if the parties correctly estimate damages on
breach. In any event, liquidated-damages provisions are not a rule of
law and are not employed in many or most contracts. We therefore
32. See Cooter, supra note 3, at 16.
33. See id. at 15, 42.
34. See Craswell, supra note 22, at 491-94.
turn our attention to the formulation of possible legal rules that
would make damages invariant to reliance.
A. A No-Damages Rule
In those remaining cases in which overreliance may occur, an
extreme way to remove a promisee's incentive to overrely would be
to adopt a rule that a promisee will receive no damages at all in the
event of a breach by a promisor. We call this a no-damages rule.
Under such a rule, the promisee would bear all the cost of investing in
reliance and therefore would have no incentive to overrely.
Such a rule would virtually put an end to contract law. If there
were no damages for breach of contract, the law would provide no
incentive to enter legally enforceable contracts. More particularly,
such a rule would fail to give the promisor the correct incentives to
take precautions and to perform. Although there is debate
concerning the effect of expectation damages on the promisee's
incentives, it is generally accepted that the expectation measure is
required to give the promisor correct incentives.
Furthermore, a no-damages rule would cause promisees to
underrely, because the more a promisee relies, the more vulnerable
she becomes to an exploitive demand for renegotiation under the
threat of nonperformance. This has been well put by Richard
Craswell, building on the work of Goetz & Scott:
[A]ny reliance by B [the promisee] must make consummation of
the deal more important to him, since reliance increases the
difference between the benefit B receives if S performs, and the
loss B suffers if S fails to perform. But once consummation of the
deal becomes more important to B, S [the promisor] can exploit
this by threatening not to perform unless B agrees to pay her a
higher price. To be sure, S's threat would be an empty one if she
would be liable for damages if she refused to perform. But if S is
free to walk away from the deal without paying damages.., then S
can credibly hold out for a larger share of B's profits.
S's ability to hold out for a share of B's profits is what distorts B's
reliance incentives in the absence of a binding commitment. B
must still bear all the downside risks of his reliance, for if it
becomes inefficient for S to perform, then she will walk away from
the deal without paying anything. But... if it becomes efficient for
S to perform ... then B will not capture all of the gains from his
reliance because S may extract some of those gains by holding out
for a higher price. In short, unless B can induce S to commit, B will
bear all of the costs of unsuccessful reliance but will not capture all
of the benefits of successful reliance. This asymmetry will often
lead B to choose too little reliance, relative to the efficient level."
35. Craswell, supra note 22, at 492. This point is a variant of the classic holdup
problem, which is central to Oliver Williamson's analysis of the theory of the firm, and
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B. A Limited No-Damages Rule
One alternative to a no-damages rule would be a rule under
which expectation damages are awarded except for the lost profits
that would have been generated by the promisee's beneficial
reliance-as opposed, for example, to lost profits due to market
shifts. We call this a limited no-damages rule.
It might be thought that under such a rule a promisee would
never engage in beneficial reliance. However, even under such a rule
a risk-neutral promisee would invest in beneficial reliance where the
expected profit from such reliance-that is, the expected profit
discounted by the prospect of breach-was positive.
For example, suppose that on January 15 Producer enters into a
contract with Star under which Star agrees to appear in Producer's
new movie, Dark Matter. Star promises to be available to start
production on October 1. Producer expects to make a profit of $40
million on the movie. There is a ten percent probability that Star will
breach. If Producer is to be ready to start shooting Dark Matter on
October 1, he must also make contracts with a director, supporting
players, a film editor, and so forth. However, Dark Matter is not a
viable project without Star. Therefore, if Star breaks his contract
with Producer, Producer will have to break his other contracts.
Producer's liability for expectation damages under these other
contracts will be $20 million. (Assume that damages for breach of
these other contracts will be based on lost wages, not beneficial
reliance, and therefore will be awarded even under a limited no-
damages rule.)
Under a limited no-damages rule, Producer's damages against
Star will not include Producer's $20 million liability on his other
contracts, because entering into those contracts constituted beneficial
reliance. Nevertheless, if Producer is risk-neutral he will enter into
both the contract with Star and the other contracts: Producer will
lose $20 million if Star breaches, but because there is a ninety percent
chance that Star will perform, Producer's expected profit on Dark
Matter is $36 million (ninety percent of $40 million). Accordingly,
Producer's investment of $20 million will have an expected payoff of
$36 million, or around a seventy-five percent return, and if he is risk-
neutral he will make the investment even under a limited no-damages
rule.
also to the work in that area of Oliver Hart and his co-authors. See OLIVER
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); OLIVER HART,
FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995). The point has been formally
analyzed in the contract-remedy literature by William Rogerson, Aaron Edlin, and Stefan
Reichelstein. See sources cited supra note 3.
Nevertheless, a limited no-damages rule would be inappropriate.
First, such a rule would not provide a promisor with the correct
incentives to take precautions and perform. Second, most actors are
risk-averse." Actors are also loss-averse; that is, the response of
actors to given losses is more extreme than their response to gains of
the same amount. 7 Therefore, the greater the possible loss, the more
36. The shareholders of a public corporation will normally prefer that it act in a risk-
neutral way. However, the managers who actually control such corporations will have all
of their human capital, and much of their financial capital, tied up in the corporation, and
hence are likely to behave in a risk-averse way in their capacity as managers (for example,
by causing the corporation to purchase commercial insurance, rather than self-insuring,
even for less-than-catastrophic risks).
37. The phenomenon of loss-aversion can be expressed in several different ways:
changes that would make things worse for an actor loom larger than changes that would
make things better; perceived losses, such as out-of-pocket costs, are more painful than
forgone gains, including potential profits and opportunity costs; the disutility of giving up
what one has is greater than the utility of acquiring what one does not have. See, e.g.,
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1327-28 (1990); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, reprinted in
THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 60 (Karen S. Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990); RICHARD
H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE
63-78 (1992).
Loss-aversion, the endowment effect (on which loss-aversion is partly based), and
some of the evidence for loss-aversion, are nicely described in Jeffrey Evans Stake, The
Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2459-62 (2001) (footnotes
omitted):
The endowment effect is a pattern of behavior in which people demand more to
give up an object than they would offer to acquire it. This difference between the
amount a person is willing to pay ... and the amount she is willing to accept...
has been explained by reference to the theory of loss aversion. According to the
theory of loss aversion, losses have greater subjective impact than objectively
commensurate gains. In graphical terms, utility curves are asymmetrical in that
the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility of acquiring it....
... In one experiment, subjects were given either a lottery ticket or $2.00
cash. When they were given the chance to trade their initial endowment for the
other endowment, somewhat surprisingly, very few subjects chose to switch.
Almost everyone preferred what they were initially given....
In a test for endowment effects reported by Professors Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups: sellers,
buyers, or choosers. Sellers were given a coffee mug and a chance to sell it at
various prices. Buyers were given a chance to buy a mug at various prices.
Choosers were given an opportunity to get either a mug or cash. Put another
way, choosers were given an option to get a mug (without paying anything) and
given the chance to sell the mug-option at various prices. The only difference
between choosers and sellers was that choosers were not actually endowed with a
mug before they were put to the task of deciding their selling price. The major
difference between choosers and buyers was that buyers were already endowed
with the cash they would have to spend to get a mug whereas the cash was merely
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risk-averse an actor is likely to be. So for 6xample, even though an
investment in Dark Matter would have a high expected rate of return,
Producer would be unlikely to take the risk of losing $20 million
under a limited no-damages rule. Accordingly, the rate of contract-
formation will be too low under a limited no-damages rule; that is,
under such a rule many contracts that would be profitable for both
parties, and therefore should be made, will not be made. Finally, the
problem of underreliance that would arise under a no-damages rule,
for the reason that Craswell points out, would also for the most part
arise under a limited no-damages rule for the same reason.
C. A Modified Expectation Measure
There is a more moderate alternative to a no-damages rule.
Cooter and others have suggested a modified version of the standard
expectation measure to give the right incentives to both the promisor
and the promisee. Under the standard expectation measure, damages
are the amount required to put the promisee in the position in which
she would have been if the contract had been performed, given the
amount of beneficial reliance that she actually engaged in. Under the
modified version of that measure, the promisee would be put in the
position that she would have been in if the contract had been
performed and she had engaged in the optimal amount of reliance.
We will call this the modified expectation measure. Because this
measure is based on the damages the promisee would incur if she had
set reliance as she should have, damages would be invariant to the
level of reliance the promisee actually chooses, and the promisee
would have no incentive to overrely. The promisor's incentives to
guard against breach and to perform would also be correct.38
a prospect for choosers. The prices at which trades, or choices, could take place
were varied across a range, and the results-how many subjects in each group
would trade-were recorded. In this way, a median valuation (or reservation
price) was determined for each group: sellers, $7.12; choosers, $3.12; buyers,
$2.87. In a replication of the experiment, in which the price tags were left on the
mugs, the results were: sellers, $7.00; choosers, $3.50; buyers, $2.00. These results
confirmed conclusions from other loss-aversion experiments. People are biased
toward the status quo. Losses have a subjectively larger impact than equivalent
financial gains, and the difference is greater than would be predicted from
declining marginal utility alone.
38. It has been suggested that the courts already make this adjustment under the
principle of Hadley v. Baxendale. However, that principle requires only that an element of
damages is reasonably foreseeable, not that the precise extent of the promisee's beneficial
reliance is reasonable. Whether a given element of damages that the promisee may suffer
(such as Yvonne's loss of profits if construction is not timely completed) is reasonably
foreseeable may not always converge with whether the precise extent of the promisee's
beneficial reliance (such as the amount of Yvonne's food purchases) is reasonable.
The modified expectation measure achieves a nifty trick, in
theory, by creating what Cooter calls "double responsibility at the
margin."3 The essential theoretical problem in the area of damages
for breach of contract is that for the promisor to have the correct
incentive to take precaution against breach and to perform, he must
bear responsibility for the costs that breach would impose upon the
promisee. However, if the promisee's beneficial reliance is at least
partially insured by the promisor, then in theory she will not bear
responsibility for the entire costs of relying too much, because the
promisor will bear at least part of those costs. In contrast, under the
modified expectation measure both parties would be responsible
for-would bear-the costs of their decisions. The promisor would
bear the costs that breach would impose upon the promisee if the
promisee had invested in reliance at no more than the optimal level.
The promisee, in turn, would bear the costs created by relying too
much, because the amount that she would receive in damages would
not increase once she exceeded the optimal level of reliance.
Nevertheless, in our view a modified expectation measure should
not be adopted, because the benefits of such a measure would be very
small, and its costs would be very large.
To begin with, such a measure would have only a very limited
practical impact. The literature on overreliance assumes that under
the standard expectation measure actual reliance will normally
exceed optimal reliance. This is not so. For the reasons described in
Parts II and III, in most cases the standard expectation measure
either cannot or will not induce overreliance. As a corollary, in most
cases damages under the standard expectation measure would be
identical to damages under the modified expectation measure.
Moreover, any remaining overreliance that may be induced by
the standard expectation measure is likely to have a low social cost.
Both observation and theory indicate that the average probability of
material breach is almost certainly very low, and correspondingly the
probability of substantial performance is very high. Under those
conditions, the actual level of reliance is likely to be very close to the
optimal level.
Furthermore, any overreliance that does occur normally will
involve only reliance expenditures that are near the margin. In the
case of these marginal expenditures, for most cost and benefit
functions the net social gain from the added expenditure will
generally be close to the net loss. Going only a little past the optimal
level of expenditure puts one in a region where the social loss is
greater than the gain from that additional expenditure, but the
difference will generally be very small.
39. Cooter, supra note 3, at 22.
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As an example, consider the Blue Angels hypothetical. Assume
that the Blue Angels' fee is $100,000 and Promoter has no other costs.
If Promoter spends $50,000 on advertising, and if the Blue Angels
give the concert, gross revenue will be $225,000. Under the standard
expectation measure, Promoter will earn a profit of $75,000. To
analyze whether Promoter's $50,000 advertising expenditure is
overreliance, we must know what gross revenue would be if there was
no advertising. Suppose that it would be $170,000. Then if Promoter
spends nothing on advertising, his profits will only be $70,000, after
paying the Blue Angels their $100,000 fee. Therefore, Promoter will
spend $50,000 on advertising. Now assume that there is a ten percent
probability that the Blue Angels will breach. On these figures,
spending $50,000 on advertising is overreliance, but the net loss due
to that overreliance is small: The net expected social benefit if the
advertising is purchased is $62,500 ((225,000 x 0.9) - (100,000 x 0.9) -
50,000). The net expected social benefit if the advertising is not
purchased is $63,000 ((170,000 x 0.9) - (100,000 x 0.9)). Thus, not
spending on advertising creates a net expected benefit that is $500
greater than spending on advertising-that is the social loss due to
overreliance in this example. If the revenue without advertising was
just $560 less, purchasing the advertising becomes socially optimal.
On the other hand, if the revenue without advertising was just $5,000
more, Promoter would prefer to not spend on advertising even under
the standard expectation measure. If this example can be
generalized, as we believe to be the case, the expected social loss due
to overreliance will rarely be very large relative to the overall stakes
in the contract. Put differently, even where overreliance can occur, it
is likely to occur only for a relatively narrow range of values.40
Since the benefits of a modified expectation measure are likely
to be very slight, we turn to the costs of such a measure. These costs
fall into two categories: the difficulty of determining the probability
of the promisor's breach and the difficulty of operationalizing and
applying a modified expectation measure.
(1) The Difficulty of Determining the Promisor's Probability of Breach
We begin with the problem of determining the promisor's
probability of breach, which is needed to calculate the optimal level
of reliance. The promisor is the lowest-cost provider of information
about the probability of his own breach. In fact, for most practical
purposes the promisor is the only practicable source of that
40. We can see this point in the Xavier-Yvonne example. In that example, the optimal
choice of y is given by p(x)Rp'(y) + (I - p(x))Rnp'(y) = 1. The standard expectation
measure leads to Yvonne setting y according to R'p(y) = 1. As p(x) gets close to 1, these
two equations will generally converge.
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information. How then can a promisee or a court determine what
constitutes optimal reliance, which depends on knowledge of the
probability of breach? Richard Craswell has proposed an ingenuous
rule to solve this problem: the promisor would be required to state
the probability that he will breach, and the promisee would be
entitled to base the amount of her reliance on that statement, whether
or not the statement was accurate. Under this rule, the actual
probability of breach would be irrelevant; only the probability stated
by promisor would count.'
In the absence of the rule that Craswell proposes, inefficient
overreliance is not a coherent concept, because a promisee cannot
practicably determine what constitutes efficient reliance. Craswell's
rule, however, presents its own difficulties, because even the promisor
is unlikely to have a good fix on the probability that he will breach
any given contract. Craswell employs a model in which a promisor
will breach if his cost of performance will exceed the contract price
plus the damages he would be required to pay if he breached.
However, a promisor will almost never know, at the time the contract
is made, the amount of the promisee's damages if he breaches.
Typically, a promisee will not disclose to the promisor the amount of
profits she expects to make. In fact, until breach actually occurs the
promisee herself often will not know how much her damages will be,
because circumstances often change between the time a contract is
made and the time of breach. The promisor's costs of performance,
which also influences the probability that he will breach, may also
change during that time. Finally, Craswell's model of breach is
incomplete, because it does not take into account that in determining
whether to breach the promisor will consider the affect of breach on
his reputation for reliability. This element will also be difficult for the
promisor to quantify, especially because the injury to the promisor's
reputation will vary according to the circumstances of the breach and
the injury that the breach inflicts on the promisee. The bottom line is
that even under Craswell's model of breach, a promisor typically will
not know, at the time the contract is made, the probability that he will
breach. Accordingly, a promisor's statement of that probability
normally will be inaccurate. Because the social costs of overreliance
depend on the actual probability of breach, not on the promisor's
stated probability of breach, if the theory of overreliance otherwise
had any bite Craswell's rule would not resolve the central difficulty
that he addresses.
41. See Craswell, supra note 21, at 367-68.
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(2) The Costs of Operationalizing and Applying a Modified
Expectation Measure
Next, the costs of operationalizing and applying a modified
expectation measure would be very high. The problem here is that
typically each element of the formula for determining damages under
a modified expectation measure would be extremely difficult to
practicably determine in any given case.
First, the probability of the promisor's overreliance would have
to be determined. As has just been shown, it is extremely unlikely
that this probability could be determined with a reasonable degree of
accuracy.
Second, the optimal amount of reliance would have to be
determined. Optimal decisions by contracting parties require each
party to take into account the effect of its decisions on the other and
to weigh the interests of the other party as equal to its own.
Accordingly, in deciding how much to rely, the promisee would have
to weigh the expected benefits to her from reliance against the
increased cost of liability that such reliance would impose upon the
promisor in the event of breach, and would rely only up to the point
where the benefits exceed those costs. This calculation would be
extremely difficult, and under the modified expectation measure a
court would have to replicate this calculation in determining how
much reliance was optimal.
Third, the court would have to make a difficult calculation
whether, given what constituted optimal reliance, the promisee had
optimally relied.
Finally, if the court determined that the promisee had overrelied,
it would have to determine how much profit the promisee would have
made if she had optimally relied.
The difficulty of determining damages under a modified
expectation measure would result in two kinds of costs, direct and
indirect. The direct costs would consist of the efforts that courts
would have to expend in calculating damages under this measure and
the efforts that lawyers would have to expend in arguing about these
calculations. The indirect costs would consist of the errors that courts
would inevitably make in undertaking the difficult and problematic
determinations that would be required. The prospect of such errors
would be likely to increase the uncertainty surrounding the
calculation of damages, thereby forcing parties to bear more
uncertainty and making it more difficult for them to plan. The
prospect of such errors also might induce promisees to underrely, for
two reasons: uncertainty in the returns to investment in reliance
would make such investments less attractive, and courts might be
inclined to push the overreliance rule too far and not compensate
promisees on the basis of reliance that was actually efficient.
The costs of administering a modified expectation measure might
be lower if there were a simple rule of thumb for measuring the
amount of reliance. The only obvious possibility for such a rule of
thumb would be to limit expectation damages for lost profits to the
amount of lost profits that would have been produced by a level of
beneficial reliance equal to (i) the level that would have been efficient
if the promisor had a zero probability of breach, discounted by (ii) the
promisor's actual probability of breach. For example, suppose the
efficient level of beneficial reliance if the promisor had a zero
probability of breach was $10,000, and the probability of breach was
ten percent. Under this rule of thumb, any amount of beneficial
reliance in excess of $9,000 would be deemed inefficient, and the
maximum damages for lost profits would be the amount of profits
that would have been produced by an investment of $9,000 in
beneficial reliance.
This rule of thumb, however, would produce inefficient results,
because it would involve a highly imperfect estimate of optimal
reliance. To begin with, this rule of thumb would not work where
reliance was lumpy and the lumps were larger than probability of
breach, or where two or more contracts had to be coordinated in
advance of performance. Next, what reliance is optimal in any given
case depends not only on the probability of breach, but also on the
shape of the relevant benefit and cost functions. These can take
many different forms. For example, assume the following variation of
the Xavier-Yvonne example: Yvonne orders her food in units. The
average price of a unit is $2.00, and the average profit that Yvonne
makes on the sale of each unit is $2.00. Yvonne will be able to sell
6,000 units per week at the new facility. The units must be ordered
seven days before the week in which they will be delivered. Yvonne
would like to order 6,000 units on August 25, seven days before the
scheduled completion date of the new facility, September 1. If
Yvonne orders the 6,000 units on August 25 and the facility is not
ready, she will need to re-sell the units on the open market. Because
Yvonne does not have access to wholesale distribution channels, she
will realize only an average of $1.90 per unit on such a resale. There
is a ten percent probability that Xavier will breach by late completion.
Assume first that Xavier performs. In that case, if Yvonne
orders 6,000 units of food prior to completion of the new facility she
will realize a profit of $12,000 in the first week after the facility opens.
If she reduces the number of units of food she orders by ten percent,
to 5,400, she will realize a profit of only $10,800 in the first week-a
difference of $1,200.
Assume now that Xavier breaches. In that case, if Yvonne orders
6,000 units her damages will be $12,600 ($12,000 lost profits plus a
loss of $600 on resale of the 6,000 units). If she orders 5,400 units, her
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damages will be only $11,340 ($10,800 lost profits plus a loss of $540
on resale of the 5,400 units)-a difference of $1,260. But since the
probability of Xavier's performance is ninety percent while the
probability of breach is only ten percent, the expected value of
Yvonne's extra profits if she orders 6,000 units is $1,080 (.90 x $1,200)
while the expected cost of Xavier's extra damages if Yvonne orders
6,000 units is only $126 (.10 x $1,260). Therefore, a reduction of
Yvonne's beneficial reliance by ten percent would be inefficient.
A final possibility is that the modified expectation measure
should be applied where, but only where, that measure is easy to
apply. Under such a regime, however, all promisors would claim that
it was easy to apply that measure in their case, so that the costs and
uncertainty that the measure brings in its trail would remain. If there
were many cases in which it was easy to apply that measure and in
which that measure would make a significant difference, the cost
might be justified. In our judgment, however, nontrivial overreliance
is likely to occur only in residual cases; of those residual cases, there
are not many where the difference between the standard expectation
measure and the modified expectation measure is likely to be
significant; and of those remaining cases, there are not many in which
the modified expectation measure would be easy to apply. Therefore,
even if there are a few cases in which the modified expectation
measure would be easy to apply and would produce significantly
different results (and provide significantly different incentives) than
the standard expectation measure, the cost of screening all contract
disputes to determine which few cases satisfy these conditions would
probably far exceed the benefits of identifying these cases.
Accordingly, the most efficient way for the concept of overreliance to
figure in contracts is to allow the contracting parties themselves to
deal with the problem, such as it is. In cases where the parties believe
there might be significant overreliance, an agreed-upon cap on
damages, based on the amount of beneficial reliance that would be
efficient in the circumstances, would be appropriate. Alternatively,
the promisee's damages on breach could be made invariant to her
beneficial reliance through contractual techniques such as liquidated
damages.
Conclusion
The theory of overreliance states that the standard expectation
measure provides inefficient incentives to a promisee because it
insures the promisee's reliance. In the absence of institutional
considerations, the theory could have significant consequences in
designing the law of contract damages. When institutional
considerations are taken into account, however, the theory has
virtually no consequences. In most cases, overreliance normally
cannot occur, because of the way in which the standard expectation
measure is instantiated in specific rules, the economics of actual
contracting, or both. Overreliance is also unlikely to occur even in
most of the residual cases, because as a result of litigation risks and
litigation costs, the standard expectation measure either does not
insure the promisee's reliance at all or does not fully insure the
promisee's reliance.
In principle, the standard expectation measure could be modified
to prevent overreliance in those few remaining cases where
overreliance might occur. However, the benefits of such a
modification would be very low, partly because overreliance is
unlikely to occur in most cases, and partly because where
overreliance does occur it is likely to involve only marginal
increments. In contrast, the costs of a modified expectation measure
would be very high, because of the direct costs that would be entailed
in applying the theory of overreliance to actual cases and the indirect
effect of those costs on the behavior of contracting parties.
It might be argued that if the standard expectation measure
provides inefficient incentives in even a small number of cases, the
measure is inefficient. But compared to what? If the standard
expectation measure provides inefficient incentives in only a small
number of cases, and even then usually affects only small marginal
increments, and a modified expectation measure would be less
efficient than the standard expectation measure, then either the
standard expectation measure is efficient relative to its best
competitor, or the inefficiency is trivial and can be safely disregarded.
Finally, the theory of overreliance implicitly assumes that
expectation damages are perfect-that the expectation measure
actually does put a promisee where she would have been if the
promisor had performed. In practice, however, that is far from the
case, because of limits on the manner in which expectation damages
are actually determined (such as the requirement of certainty, the
principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, and the lack of compensation for
the costs of successful litigation), and the litigation risks and costs to
which those limits give rise. Indeed, given these limits, risks, and
costs, it is likely that in practice, rather than overinvesting in reliance,
promisees will tend to underinvest in reliance.42
42. We are indebted to Aaron Edlin for this observation.
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